In Context by Frans H. van Eemeren
In Context
Giving Contextualization its Rightful Place in the Study
of Argumentation
Frans H. van Eemeren
Published online: 23 April 2011
 The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract ‘In Context’ is aimed at giving contextualization its rightful place in the
study of argumentation. First, Frans H. van Eemeren explains the crucial role of
context in a reconstructive analysis of argumentative discourse. He distinguishes
four levels of contextualization. Second, he situates his approach to context in the
field of argumentation studies by comparing it with Walton’s approach. He
emphasizes the importance of distinguishing clearly between a normatively moti-
vated theoretical ideal model and empirically-based communicative activity types.
Third, van Eemeren concentrates on the ‘macro-level’ of contextualization: con-
textualization in institutionalized communicative activity types. He makes clear that
the macro-context of a communicative activity type can be characterized argu-
mentatively by describing the disctinctive features of the empirical counterparts of
the four stages of a critical discussion in the activity type concerned. Fourth, he
points out what the consequences of the macrocontextualization of argumentative
discourse in a certain communicative activity type are for the strategic maneuvering
that may takes place and the identification of fallacies as derailments of strategic
maneuvering. Fifth, van Eemeren draws some general conclusions regarding the
role of contextualization in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.
Keywords Communicative activity type  Context  Contextualization 
Fallacy as derailment of strategic maneuvering  Reconstructive analysis 
Strategic maneuvering
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1 The Role of Context in a Reconstructive Analysis
The need for argumentation, the requirements of argumentation, and the structure of
argumentation are all adapted to a context in which doubts, opposition, objections,
and counterclaims arise. In argumentative practice there are a great many of such
contexts. In some of them argumentation is put forward to support a descriptive
standpoint, in other contexts it may support an evaluative or a prescriptive
standpoint. Some argumentation theorists concentrate in the first place, or even
exclusively, on argumentation put forward in defence of descriptive claims about
factual states of affairs, other argumentation theorists tend to focus on argumen-
tation relating to evaluative judgments of the ethical quality of a disputed way of life
or the esthetic quality of a work of art, and still others deal almost exclusively with
argumentation in favour of prescriptive incitements to carry out some particular
action or to refrain from doing so. Unlike Aristotle and his fellow rhetoricians, these
argumentation theorists usually connect their analysis and evaluation of argumen-
tation only implicitly with the specific context of communicative activity or the
domain of communication in which the argumentative discourse takes place. In my
opinion, however, argumentation theorists should not only pay equal attention to
argumentation for all types of standpoints, but also take the contextual embedd-
edness of argumentative discourse explicitly into account in their analysis and
evaluation—thus giving contextualization its rightful place in the study of
argumentation.
In order to be able to give a fair evaluation of an argumentative text or discourse,
a reconstructive analysis is needed of all argumentative moves made that are
analytically relevant because they play a potential part in resolving a difference of
opinion on the merits.1 This analysis should result in an ‘‘analytic overview’’ that
provides a reconstruction of the various components of the discourse that are
pertinent to judging the quality of the resolution process.2 In the reconstruction
process, the difference of opinion defined in the confrontation stage could, for
instance, be identified as a ‘‘mixed difference of opinion’’ (as in ‘‘I do not agree at
all; in my opinion, it is just the opposite’’) and an argument that has been advanced
in the argumentation stage to resolve the difference of opinion could, for instance,
be identified as a ‘‘symptomatic argument’’ (as in ‘‘Paula will do her utmost,
because North Americans are competitive’’). In an analytic overview, all ingredients
of the discourse relevant to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits are thus
identified and described in terms of well-defined analytic categories, so that the
1 For analytic and evaluative relevance, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 71, 73, 88) and,
more in particular, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992b).
2 Due to a variety of factors, argumentative reality seldom resembles the ideal of a critical discussion—as
is to be expected when comparing reality with an ideal. The obvious fact that in ordinary argumentative
discourse the various stages of a critical discussion are often implicit, unclear, distorted and accompanied
by diversions, should neither give rise to the premature conclusion that the discourse is deficient nor to the
superficial conclusion that the ideal model of critical discussion is not realistic. The former is contradicted
by pragmatic insight concerning the conduct of ordinary discourse, the latter by dialectical insight
concerning the requirements for resolving differences of opinion. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1984, chapter 4; 1992a, chapter 5); and van Eemeren et al. (1993, chapter 3).
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overview constitutes an appropriate point of departure for a systematic evaluation of
the discourse concerned.3
A reconstructive analysis of argumentative discourse aimed at constructing an
analytic overview of the discourse boils down to carrying out some specific analytic
operations that can be characterized as ‘‘reconstrution transformations’’ (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, ch. 5). The transformations carried out in the
reconstruction process consist in the first place of leaving out of consideration all
speech acts performed in the discourse that do really not play a part in the resolution
process. This transformation boils down to a ‘‘deletion’’ of all irrelevant elements,
such as repetitions and unnecessary digressions. In the second place, the
reconstruction involves rearranging in an insightful way those speech acts whose
order does not correctly reflect their function in the resolution process. This
‘‘permutation’’ transformation amounts to bringing together separate parts of the
discourse that belong together viewed from the perspective of resolving a difference
of opinion on the merits. In the third place, a reconstructive analysis means making
explicit all argumentative moves that remain implicit in the discourse but are
pertinent to the resolution process. This transformation involves, among other
things, the ‘‘addition’’ of implicit premises and the completion of elements that were
expressed elliptically in the discourse. In the fourth place, the reconstruction
includes reformulating in an unequivocal way those speech acts performed in the
discourse whose function in the resolution process would otherwise be opaque. This
‘‘substitution’’ transformation leads to the replacement of confusingly ambiguous
expressions referring to vital elements of the resolution process by univocal
paraphrases.
The analytic overview resulting from a reconstructive analysis should be
accounted for theoretically and empirically, so that it becomes clear that all
transformations that have been carried out are indeed justified.4 The transformations
that go beyond a naı¨ve reading of the discourse should be analytically pertinent and
faithful to the commitments that may be ascribed to the speaker or writer concerned.
Only when both requirements have been fulfilled, can the reconstruction process
result in an analytic overview that constitutes an appropriate basis for carrying out
an evaluation of the discourse. The evaluation should bring to light which of the
analytically relevant moves that were made may be considered evaluatively relevant
as well because they comply with the dialectical norms incorporated in the rules for
3 The components of an analytic overview are all pertinent to judging the soundness of an argumentative
discourse. If it is not clear exactly what difference of opinion underlies the discourse, there will be no way
of telling whether the difference has been resolved by the discourse. If it is not clear precisely which
positions the parties have adopted in the difference of opinion, it will be impossible to tell in whose favor
the discussion has ended. If implicit or indirect premises are not taken into account, crucial arguments
may be overlooked, so that the evaluation is inadequate. If the argument schemes employed in supporting
standpoints and sub-standpoints are not recognized, it cannot be determined whether the links between the
individual reasons and the standpoints are resistant to the kinds of criticism their specific make-up is
bound to elicit. If the structure of the argumentation advanced in favor of a standpoint is not laid bare, it
cannot be judged whether the argumentation put forward in defense of the standpoint constitutes a
coherent whole that provides sufficient support for the standpoint.
4 These requirents follow from the fact that the analysis carried out can be characterized as a theoretically
motivated and empirically justified pragma-dialectical reconstruction of what is going on in the discourse.
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conducting a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the
merits. In accounting theoretically for a reconstructive analysis and in identifying in
the evaluation the fallacies committed in the discourse in a theoretically justified
way. The pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion and the code of
conduct for conducting such a discussion are the proper heuristic, analytical and
critical instruments.
In accounting empirically for a reconstruction leading to a particular analytic
overview the analyst can refer to various sources. First, there is the text of the
discourse (and its visual accompaniments, if any). In giving an empirical
justification of a reconstruction the text is always the primary source. In his
account the analyst should refer to those lines of the discourse that support his
analysis, if necessary complemented by a reference to functional and structural
properties of the discourse supporting the analysis.
Second, there is the context in which an extract from the discourse whose
reconstruction is to be accounted for appears. As far as context is concerned, the
analyst’s source for justification can be the micro-context consisting of the text
immediately preceding or following the extract at issue, which is also referred to as
the ‘‘linguistic’’ context.5 The contextual source exploited by the analyst in
accounting for his reconstruction can also be the context in a wider sense. This is the
case when the analyst refers to the meso-context or ‘‘situation’’—sometimes also
referred to as the ‘‘constituation’’—in which the reconstructed extract occurs,6 to the
macro-context of the ‘‘speech event’’—more generally, the ‘‘communicative activity
type’’ in which the extract is used—or to the intertextual or interdiscursive context
of other speech events the extract concerned, or the speech event in which it occurs
as a whole, is in some way or other connected with.7 The context—in any of the
forms just mentioned—may be a decisive source, for instance, in accounting for the
reconstruction of a ‘‘pragmatic optimum’’ when making an unexpressed premise
explicit.
Apart from the text and the context, third, there are inferences the analyst can
make and use as a source for accounting for his reconstructive analysis. Next to
references to a logical reasoning process providing the basis for including certain
presuppositions and implications of what is said in the discourse in the analysis, the
analyst may refer in his account of his reconstruction to pragmatic inferences based
on common sense, by pointing, for instance, to Gricean implicatures or pragmatic
inconsistencies in the discourse.
5 It goes without saying, however, that in particular in oral argumentative discourse the so-called
paralinguistic phenomena need to be taken into account too.
6 The ‘‘meso’’-context is also referred to as the ‘‘extra-linguistic’’ context, but the extra-linguistic context
includes also what I call the ‘‘macro’’-context and the ‘‘intertextual’’ context, and in these contexts
linguistic phenomena play a part too.
7 The analysis of Willem of Orange’s Apologie, for instance, in which Orange defends the Dutch revolt
against King Filip of Spain, can only be accounted for if it is taken into account that the Apologie is a
response to Filip’s Ban Edict (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000). Wodak distinguishes
‘‘interdiscursivity’’ from ‘‘intertextuality’’ (2009, pp. 39–40). In her usage, intertextuality refers to ‘‘the
linkage of all texts to other texts, both in the past and in the present’’ (p. 39), whereas interdiscursivity
indicates ‘‘that topic-oriented discourses are linked to each other in various ways’’ (p. 40).
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Fourth, and finally, there is background information that can be referred to by the
analyst as a source of justification for his analysis. The general background
information he may refer to includes knowledge of certain general rules and
regulations that are instrumental in understanding the extract. In justifying his
reconstruction of the argumentation advanced in ‘‘Bart cannot have gone to the
swimming pool because his swimming trunks are on the line,’’ for instance, the
analyst may refer to the generally shared background information that men are
obliged to wear swimming trunks in public swimming pools—and that they
normally own just one pair of them (which may in certain cases be contradicted by
special background information). More often than not, the analyst may be able to
refer also to specific background information as a source of justification for his
reconstruction. Such specific background information can be inside information,
such as that Bart has just bought new swimming trunks, which is available only to
those familiar with the matter at issue—friends, family, colleagues, or other people
who are in the know. Specific background information can also consist of expert
information, possessed only by those having special knowledge of the topic or field
at issue.
In a great many cases, most certainly in the problematic ones, the analyst has to
refer to a combination of sources in accounting for his reconstruction. Then, he must
make sure that the sources referred to do indeed reinforce each other, instead of
instigating results that are in fact inconsistent. In my present contribution to the
contextualization of the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse, which
is titled In Context, I aim to highlight the contextual factor. Although context is
sometimes taken to be something fixed, the context and its interpretation by the
participants in the discourse change in fact continually during the argumentative
exchange—if only because by every argumentative move that is made the context is
reshaped. Having thus unraveled the complicated notion of context by distinguish-
ing between micro-, meso-, macro- and intertextual context, today I would like to
concentrate on the macro-context of argumentative discourse—the most relevant
dimension of context when it comes to conventionalization.
2 Walton’s Postmodern View of Argumentation in Context
The problem of how to conceptualize the macro-contextual dimension of
argumentation has led Douglas Walton to propose an approach of the contextuality
of argumentation centering on the concept of ‘‘dialogue types’’ as ‘‘conversational
contexts of argument’’ and given shape together with Erik Krabbe (Walton and
Krabbe 1995).8 Walton gives the concept of dialogue types a double function. Not
only should they prescribe which argumentative behavior is correct, or reasonable,
within the bounds of a well-delineated language game, but they also have to mirror
8 Walton argues that the concept of dialogue types revives in fact—as so often happens in the study of
argumentation—a classical Aristotelian idea, viz., that the soundness or fallaciousness of argumentation
depends not just on form, but on the context of dialogue (1992: 143). One may add that Aristotle
developed a rhetorically-minded conceptualization of the contexts of argumentation in his division of the
deliberative, the forensic and the epideictic genre.
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in their structure ‘‘the typical conversational settings,’’ or—as Hymes (1972) calls
them—‘‘speech events,’’ characteristic of a given communicative reality. According
to Walton, each dialogue type constitutes a separate normative model of
argumentation, with its own specific rules prescribing what good and fallacious
argumentation is. Thus Walton proposes—as he acknowledges in so many words—
a ‘‘postmodern and relativistic standard of rationality’’ (1998b, p. 30).
As used by Walton, the notion of context is limited to dialogue types understood
as rule-governed and generic conversational entities.9 Walton and Krabbe organize
the plurality of dialogues types they observe in a typology of six ‘‘general types:’’
persuasion dialogue,10 negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking
dialogue, and eristics (1995, p. 66). These types of dialogues are primarily
distinguished through their main goals: ‘‘resolution of […] conflicts by verbal
means’’ (persuasion dialogue), ‘‘making a deal’’ (negotiation), ‘‘reaching a
(provisional) accommodation in a relationship’’ (eristics), etc. Next, the six basic
types differ as regards the initial situation, the participants’ aims (not to be confused
with the goal of a dialogue as such), and the side benefits of each.
According to Walton and Krabbe, the usefulness of the concept of dialogue types
to argumentation theory lies in its capacity to account systematically for the
difficulties related to the contextuality of fallacies. As I have indicated, their
dialogue types are supposed to fulfill a normative function. In the simplest
formulation this context-dependent normativity amounts to the claim that ‘‘a good
argument is one that contributes to a goal of the type of dialogue in which that
argument was put forward’’ (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 2). In sum, their solution
to the problem of the contextuality of argumentation is that each dialogue type (after
sufficient specification, pp. 66–67) yields a separate normative model of argumen-
tation, with its own specific rules prescribing what good argumentation is.11
The practical value of any theoretical approach of context by argumentation
theorists depends on how useful this approach is to the analysis and evalution of
actual argumentative discourse. For Walton and Krabbe’s theoretical framework to
be of practival value, two interrelated problems need to be resolved. First, there is
the unclear relation between the six normative (general) dialogue types they
distinguish to the plethora of types of communicative contexts actually encountered
and perceived by the arguers. Second, there is the unexplained way in which
fallacies occur in the various types of dialogue.
9 Recently, Walton and Macagno introduced a notion of ‘‘dialogue context’’ referring to ‘‘a broader
notion of dialogue,’’ which includes, among other things, ‘‘common ground,’’ ‘‘interpersonal relation-
ship,’’ and ‘‘social constraints’’ between arguers (2007, p. 110). This approach extends the contextual
considerations pertinent to argumentation analysis and evaluation beyond the goal-directed and rule-
governed structure of the dialogue types, bringing Walton’s theoretical framework closer to being a
rhetorical perspective.
10 Confusingly, because in pragma-dialectics the term critical discussion has been in use for many years
to refer to a theoretical construct rather than a communicative activity type or dialogue type, and in using
the term critical discussion Walton and Krabbe refer to the pragma-dialectical concept but change its
content. See van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2007, p. 64).
11 Basically the dialogue types are empirical entities and only if the rules and goals are precisely laid
down by a theorist one gets a normative model (see Walton and Krabbe 1995, pp. 66–67).
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Because Walton and Krabbe are well aware that their six basic types of dialogue
cannot cover all ordinary speech events, in dealing with the first issue they assume
that a great many speech events are composites of two or more of the six dialogue
types (1995, p. 82). In other words, they take it that there is a ‘‘synchronic
multiplicity’’ of various types of dialogue constituting together a particular speech
event. A political debate, for instance, as we know it in Western democracies,
escapes any one-speech-event-to-one-dialogue-type classification. Walton (1998b,
p. 223) regards Question Period, a specific kind of political debate he distinguishes,
as a type of context for argumentation that involves, next to two subtypes of the
persuasion dialogue, a mixture of no less than four (out of six) general types of
dialogue. It is partly an information-seeking dialogue, partly an eristic dialogue,
partly a negotiation, and partly a persuasion dialogue. In such complex cases, some
obvious problems arise concerning how the evaluation should take place and what
useful role the distinction between the six dialogue types still has to play in this
endeavor. By which standards associated with the six basic types of dialogue, for
instance, should the arguer’s performance in the ‘‘mixed’’ speech event of a political
debate be judged? Walton’s easy solution that ‘‘it is conditionally permissible to
evaluate a political debate […] from the point of view of a critical discussion’’
(1998b, p. 224) begs the question and undermines in fact his very approach to
context.
The second issue, regarding the fallacies, is dealt with by viewing the problem as
a problem of a ‘‘diachronic multiplicity’’ of dialogues. The conceptual tool to solve
this problem is the notion of ‘‘dialectical shifts.’’ Walton’s central observation is
that discussions that emerge and develop are liable to take turns that—in his
theoretical framework—can be perceived as shifts from one type of dialogue to
another. The central distinction between such shifts is the normative division
between licit and illicit shifts. Licit shifts are overt and mutually agreed upon moves
away from the dialogue the participants were originally supposed to carry out to
another type of dialogue that still serves, or at least does not block, reaching the
goals of the original dialogue (Walton 1992, pp. 138–139). By contrast, illicit shifts
are covert and unilateral attempts to change the original type of dialogue into
another one, which is wrongly presented as being in line with the original dialogue.
It is the illicit type of shift, which is often ‘‘associated,’’ as Walton puts it, with the
informal fallacies. The problem, however, seems to me that it is hard, if not
impossible, for an analyst to determine when exactly a ‘‘dialectical shift’’ has taken
place and whether or not it is illicit.
As I have explained more elaborately elsewhere (van Eemeren 2010), all in all, in
my view, Walton’s approach to the contextualization of the analysis and evaluation
of argumentative discourse does not offer a satisfactory perspective. In my search
for a more promising alternative I hope to avoid at least some of the obstacles that
prevent Walton’s approach from offerig good prospects. To begin with, after
distinguishing first between various types of contexts, I already indicated more
precisely with what type of context I am presently concerned with, so that the
complicated notion of context does not remain elusive because it is a mer a` boire.
Other alternatives I would like to suggest can be summarized in the following
questions. Is viewing the various types of macro-contexts as dialogue types really
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the most appropriate approach or would it be better to define macro-contexts in
relation with the institutionalized communicative environments in which they play a
part? Would it not be expedient to avoid mixing empirical description with critical
normativity in one and the same notion and distinguish, instead, clearly between, on
the one hand, the empirical dimension of describing the argumentative practices that
can be distinguished in argumentative reality and, on the other hand, the critical
dimension of assessing the quality of the argumentative discourse conducted in the
various argumentative practices?
3 Contextualization in Institutionalized Communicative Activity Types
In my own dealings with macro-contexts, I start from the observation that
‘‘argumentation’’ is not just a theoretical concept given shape in analytical models
such as the ideal model of a critical discussion but also, and even in the first place,
an empirical phenomenon that can be observed in a multitude of communicative
practices. Because these communicative practices are connected with specific kinds
of institutionalized communicative contexts in which they serve a variety of
institutionally relevant purposes, they have become conventionalized in accordance
with varying kinds of requirements.12 Due to the context-dependency of commu-
nicative practices, the possibilities for strategic maneuvering between dialectical
reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness taking place in the argumentative
discourse conducted in such practices are to some extent determined by the
institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative practice concerned. This
makes it necessary to situate the analysis and evaluation of strategic maneuvering in
the macro-context of the ‘‘communicative activity type’’ in which the maneuvering
occurs (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005).
The macro-context of a communicative activity type can be characterized by
describing, starting from the domain of communicative activity to which the
communicative practice concerned belongs, the institutional conventions that are
instrumental in realizing, through the employment of a particular ‘‘genre’’ of
communicative activity, the ‘‘institutional point’’ of the communicative practice.13
Assuming that the conventionalization of communicative activity types has come
into being for the purpose of realizing the institutional point of the communicative
practices concerned, the conventionalization of every speech event which can be
recognized intersubjectively as representing a communicative practice may be
deemed dependent on the institutional rationale of that communicative practice.14
12 I use the terms institution, institutional and institutionalized in a very broad sense, so that they refer to
any established macro-context in which certain communicative conventions have developed.
13 This concept of activity type was introduced in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005) and is explained in
more detail in van Eemeren (2010). Levinson uses the term activity type in the meaning of ‘‘fuzzy
category whose focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on
participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions’’ (1992, p. 69).
14 My approach connects with ‘‘rational choice institutionalism’’ within New Institutionalism as
practiced in political science, economics, anthropology and sociology. In dealing with the question of
how to construe the relationship between institutions and behavior, new institutionalism emphasizes the
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Such an institutional rationale reflects the institutional needs the communicative
practice aims to satisfy and manifests itself in the domain of communicative activity
in which the communicative activity type has developed in concrete speech events.
Sometimes we are interested exclusively in one particular historical speech event, as
when Peter Houtlosser and I analyzed the Apologia pamphlet that William the
Silent published in 1580, in response to the Ban Edict issued by King Philip II of
Spain, to justify his role in the Dutch Revolt (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999,
2000). Generally, however, when communication and argumentation theorists study
speech events they are examining them as ‘‘tokens,’’ ‘‘instantiations’’ or ‘‘repre-
sentations’’ of a communicative activity type.
Viewed in this way, communicative activity types are conventionalized
communicative practices whose conventionalization serves the institutional needs
of a certain domain of communicative activity through the implementation of a
specific genre of communicative activity.15 The genres of communicative activity
prototypically employed in a communicative activity type may vary from
‘‘adjudication’’ in the legal domain, ‘‘deliberation’’ in the political domain,
‘‘mediation’’ in the problem-solving domain, ‘‘disputation’’ in the scholarly domain,
et cetera.16 Realizing the institutional point of a communicative activity type
through the use of the appropriate genre of communicative activity amounts to
accomplishing the institutional mission undertaken when engaging in this activity
type in a certain domain of communication. In some cases, the conventions
governing a particular communicative activity type, or ‘‘family’’ of communicative
activity types, consist of fully explicit constitutive or regulative rules; in other cases,
of rules of that are largely implicit, or are to be derived from established practices.
Footnote 14 continued
relative autonomy of political institutions and the importance of symbolic action to understanding
institutionalized behavior (March and Olsen 1984, p. 734). According to Hall and Taylor, rational choice
institutionalism draws our attention to ‘‘the role that strategic interaction between actors plays in the
determination of political outcomes’’ (1996, p. 951). Generally this approach is highly ‘‘functionalist’’ in
the sense of explaining the origins of an institution largely in terms of the effects that follow from its
existence, ‘‘intentionalist’’ in the sense of assuming that the process of institutional creation is a highly
purposive one, and its analyses are highly ‘‘voluntarist’’ in the sense that they tend to view institutional
creation as a quasi-contractual process marked by voluntary agreement among relatively equal and
independent actors (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 952).
15 As explained by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005), communicative activity types are not on a par
with theoretical constructs such as the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion. While these
theoretical constructs are based on analytic considerations concerning the best way of reaching a certain
(abstract) objective such as resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, the various communicative
activity types are empirically-based prototypes of conventionalized communicative practices. Unlike
theoretical constructs such as the model of a critical discussion, which are designs for identifying the
constitutive parts of a problem-valid procedure for achieving a specific normative objective, the various
communicative activity types and their associated speech events represent communicative practices that
have come into being and have been conventionalized in the culturally established pursuit of realizing the
institutional point of a communicative activity. By distinguishing in this way between an ideal model and
argumentative activity types, and making a fundamental theoretical distinction between these two
categories of concepts, we deviate in an essential way from approaches to argumentative discourse types
such as Walton’s (1998a) and Walton and Krabbe’s (1995).
16 Such genres can also be viewed as ‘‘families’’ or ‘‘conglomerates’’ of communicative activity serving
certain clusters of communicative activity types.
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Among the communicative activity types that have come into being in the legal
domain, where arbitration is the dominant genre, are—to mention just a few
disparate examples—court proceedings, arbitration and summoning. Communica-
tive activity types in the political domain, where the genre of deliberation is most
prominently used, are, for instance, the General Debate in Dutch parliament,
American Presidential Debates and Prime Minister’s Question Time in British
Parliament. The general institutional point shared by the communicative activity
types I just mentioned for the adjudicatory legal activity types is guaranteeing that
justice will be done, and for those mentioned for the deliberative political activity
types that democracy is preserved. More specifically, a General Debate in Dutch
Parliament, for instance, has the institutional aim of confronting the government of
the day with the views of the elected representatives of the people concerning policy
plans and their financial backing. The institutional conventions of the communi-
cative activity type of a General Debate are established by parliamentary tradition
and its format is laid down in parliamentary procedure. The more specific
institutional aim of Prime Minister’s Question Time, to give another example, is to
hold the Prime Minister to account for his government’s policies. The institutional
conventions of this communicative activity type and its format are determined by
existing regulations of the House of Commons Procedure Committee and the
parliamentary rule of order. Other individual activity types can be characterized in a
similar way by describing the specific aims they are supposed to serve, the
institutional conventions that need to be taken into account, and the procedural
format.17
To illustrate the relationship between communicative activity types.certain
genres of communicative activity, and certain concrete speech events, I have listed
in Table 1 on your handout the communicative activity types just mentioned
together with some other communicative activity types from other domains of
communicative activity. I have mentioned in italics for the italicized communica-
tive activity types some concrete speech events in which the activity types have
manifested themselves.
Communicative activity types may be non-argumentative, but in a great deal of
them—directly or indirectly—argumentation plays a part, whether structurally or
incidentally, so that the activity types concerned are partly or wholly argumentative.
A parliamentary debate, for instance, is inherently argumentative, a political
interview argumentative in essence, whereas a love letter or a prayer is as a rule not
17 In ‘‘Accusing someone of an inconsistency as a confrontational way of strategic manoeuvring,’’
Andone (2009a) demonstrates that the argumentative activity type of a political interview creates, through
a set of rules and conventions, certain contextual preconditions for the performance of confrontational
argumentative moves in strategic maneuvering. Besides Andone’s (2009b) study of strategic maneuvering
in political interviews, which I here briefly discuss, other pragma-dialectical studies of political
communication making use of deliberation are Mohammed (2009a), who examines Prime Minister’s
Question Time in British parliament, Tonnard (2009), who concentrates on the general debate in Dutch
parliament, and Lewinski (2010), who analyzes Internet Forum discussions. Ihnen (in preparation)
focuses on law-making debates in British parliament. Pragma-dialectical studies regarding communi-
cative activity types making use of other genres of communicative activity are carried out by Feteris
(2009) for adjudication in the legal domain and Pilgram (in preparation) and van Poppel (in preparation)
for consultation in the medical domain.
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Table 1 Examples of communicative activity types implementing certain genres of communicative































Mediated talks between Richard and


























Shell’s newspaper message about






Dima’s talk with Corina about
how they spent the weekend
a My conception of the genre of deliberation, which is different from Walton and Krabbe’s (1995) and
Walton’s (1998b) conception, includes Auer’s (1962, p. 146) debate, defined as: ‘‘(1) a confrontation, (2)
in equal and adequate time (3) of matched contestants, (4) on a stated proposition, (5) to gain an audience
decision,’’ but is also allows for the possibility of communicative activity types such as television debates
which do not always start from a stated proposition and an explicitly decisive audience (Martel 1983,
p. 3). Cf. Perlof (1998, pp. 380–381)
b In contradistinction with legal dispute resolution by adjudication, problem-solving by mediation is also
known as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), but I avoid using this terminology because negotiation
and certain types of adjudication, such as arbitration, are also reckoned to belong to ADR, in spite of vital
differences between them and mediation. My division of domains of communicative activity is certainly
not mutually exclusive and there may be combined or overlapping communicative activity types, such as
‘‘arb-med’’ (Ross and Conlon 2000)
c As an illustration of the problems of classification it might be mentioned that the peace talks leading to
the Camp David Accords in 1978 are sometimes treated as a case of mediation, but this goes against some
major characteristics of these talks as they are described by the participants and it requires the mediator to




argumentative, although at times even they might be argumentative. Communica-
tive activity types which are inherently or essentially argumentative are called
‘‘argumentative activity types,’’ but in analytic practice the term argumentative
activity type is used for all communicative activity types that have an argumentative
dimension (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005).
The ideal model of a critical discussion developed in pragma-dialectics can be
instrumental in characterizing a communicative activity type as an argumentative
activity type. In argumentative reality, the four stages of a critical discussion are
‘‘realized’’ in different fashions in the various argumentative activity types,
depending on the prevailing institutional requirements. For each communicative
activity type at issue in an analysis it must therefore be determined in what way it
can be characterized argumentatively by describing the distinctive features of the
empirical equivalents of the four stages of a critical discussion: the initial situation,
the procedural and material starting points, the argumentative means and criticisms,
and the possible outcome. To illustrate what such argumentative characterizations
involve, I have indicated in Table 2 on your handout the argumentatively relevant
institutional conventions defining the families of communicative activity types
making prototypically use of adjudication, deliberation, mediation, and negotiation.
4 Macro-Contextual Conventionalization and the Identification
of Fallacies (4 pp)
Argumentation theorists are out to develop tools for judging the quality of
argumentative discourse. Finding a theoretically-based method for identifying the
fallacies that may occur in argumentative discourse plays a crucial role in this
endeavor. The way in which tithe fallacies are tackled can even be seen as the acid
test for any normative theory of argumentation.
In my view, the treatment of the fallacies has to start from a general and coherent
theoretical perspective on argumentative discourse that provides a common
rationale for the identification of the fallacies.18 The starting point of the pragma-
dialectical theory, that argumentative discourse is always aimed at resolving a
difference of opinion on the merits, puts the study of argumentative discourse in
such a general and coherent perspective. This perspective provides a common
18 A fundamental problem that threatens fallacy theory, in particular when each fallacy gets its own
theoretical treatment, is that not only the treatments of the various fallacies are at variance with each
other, but also the general perspectives from which these treatments start. Although in principle giving
each fallacy its own treatment does not prevent the theorist from making all fallacy judgments from the
same perspective (say a formal perspective as favored by Woods (1992) or an epistemological perspective
as favored by Biro and Siegel (1992)), in practice often one perspective is used in one case and another in
an other case, and different perspectives may even get mixed up. In such cases, ethical or moral
considerations, for instance, all of a sudden get the upper hand over logical (or other) considerations
relating to the perspective claimed to have been chosen. Wagemans (2003) provides a good illustration
when he discusses Walton’s (1999) treatment of the argumentum ad ignorantiam. In his analysis, Walton
introduces an epistemic norm to condemn such ‘‘arguments.’’ Next, however, he starts classifying
exceptions to this norm, and mentions, instead of epistemic considerations, practical considerations
relating to the consequences of applying the norm.
152 F. H. van Eemeren
123
rationale to the study of the fallacies because the reason for considering an
argumentative move as fallacious is in each particular case that this move is in some
way or other prejudicial or harmful for the realization of the general goal of
resolving a difference of opinion on the merits.
Because a theory of errors cannot be constructed independently of a theory of
correctness,19 a unified theory of the fallacies must be incorporated in a normative
theory of argumentation that defines the standards or rules for sound argumentative
discourse. Only in this way can it be made clear in what sense a fallacy represents a
Table 2 Argumentative characterizations of communicative activity types making prototypically use of
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situation)
19 Jacobs (2002, p. 122) correctly observes that ‘‘no list of categories will ever exhaustively enumerate all
the ways in which argumentation can go wrong.’’
In Context 153
123
kind of wrongness and can all fallacies be related to the observation of certain
general norms of soundness. In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, this
requirement is realized by relating all fallacies systematically to the soundness
norms expressed in the rules for critical discussion. In principle, each of the rules
constitutes a distinct standard for critical discussion. Any argumentative move that
is an infringement of any of the rules, whichever party performs it and at whatever
stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution of the difference of
opinion and must therefore (and in this particular sense) be regarded as fallacious. In
this way, fallacies are defined as speech acts that prejudice or frustrate efforts to
resolve a difference of opinion on the merits.
When it comes to the identification of fallacies, the pragma-dialectical evaluation
procedure starts with identifying the moves made in the discourse as particular kinds
of speech acts creating certain sets of commitments for the participants. Next it is to
be determined whether the performance of these speech acts agrees in every
particular case with the rules for critical discussion. If a (reconstructed) speech act
proves to violate any of the pragma-dialectical rules, it must be determined precisely
what kind of norm violation this entails. In practice, this determination can be
achieved only if it is clear exactly which soundness criteria for satisfying the critical
norm pertain in that particular stage of the resolution process to the case concerned.
The implementation of these criteria may vary to some extent depending on the
macro-context of the communicative activity type in which the argumentative
discourse takes place.
In tackling the ‘‘demarcation problem’’ of how to distinguish in actual
argumentative discourse between sound and fallacious moves I have proposed to
view fallacious moves as derailments of strategic maneuvering in which a rule for
critical discussion has been violated. This means that in such cases the dialectical
criteria pertaining to carrying out the mode of strategic maneuvering concerned
have not been satisfied and the pursuit of rhetorical interests has gained the upper
hand.20 When reflecting upon the criteria that can be brought to bear to distinguish
between sound and fallacious strategic maneuvering, I make a distinction between
general criteria for judging fallaciousness that are context-independent and more
specific criteria that may be dependent on the macro-context in which the strategic
maneuvering takes place. The specific context of the communicative activity type
requires an implementation of the general criteria that is geared with the
communicative activity type concerned. In any particular case it must be determined
to what extent, and in what way, in the macro-context of the communicative activity
type the general soundness criteria for using the mode of strategic maneuvering at
issue need to be further specified, amended or supplemented with context-dependent
20 This approach differs considerably from how the demarcation problem is dealt with by other
argumentation theorists. On the one hand, there are argumentation theorists, such as Biro and Siegel
(1992) and Johnson (2000), who give precedence to epistemological considerations and view fallacies as
argumentative moves that obstruct in some way or other the search for the truth. On the other hand, there
are rhetorically-minded theorists such as Willard (1995) and Leff (2000) who go primarily by empirical
standards and view the fallacies in a more relativistic way as argumentative moves that are not accepted
in a certain communicative community. Although in some cases the results of the theorizing may be
virtually the same, these perspectives from which the fallacies are approached are fundamentally different
from each other and from ours.
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specific soundness criteria. In some particular cases—among them are most
textbook examples and similar clear-cut cases of fallacious maneuvering—there is
no real need to take the conventionalization of the macro-context into account
because it is already clear that the context-independent general soundness criteria
pertaining to that mode of strategic maneuvering have not been satisfied.
As a case in point, I would like to discuss the demarcation of non-fallacious and
fallacious moves in the mode of strategic maneuvering known as appealing to an
authority to defend a standpoint. Like using other symptomatic arguments, using
arguments from authority is potentially a sound mode of strategic maneuvering. In a
great many cases, we are fully justified in supporting our claims by referring to an
authority who is supposed to know—in argumentative reality this is in fact often the
only sensible thing we can do. If, however, one or more of the ‘‘critical questions’’
for checking if the general criteria for judging arguments from authority have been
fulfilled cannot be answered satisfactorily, an appeal to authority is not justified.
Among the general soundness conditions are, for instance, that the parties in the
discussion should agree in principle on appealing to an authority,21 that the source
referred to does indeed have the professed authority, that this authority is pertinent
to the topic at issue in the difference of opinion, that the source was serious when he
made the statement that is quoted, that he is quoted regarding correctly, and on a
point where this is relevant to resolving the difference of opinion (cf. Woods and
Walton 1989, pp. 15–24; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a, pp. 136–137). If
there are good reasons to think that any of these conditions has not been fulfilled
(e.g., when the authoritative source is evidently misquoted), the strategic
maneuvering by an appeal to authority has derailed because it violates the
Argument Scheme Rule and must be viewed as an argumentum ad verecundiam
(van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2003).22
More often than not, in the end, fallacy judgments are—or should be—contextual
judgments that depend on the specific conventionalization of the communicative
activity type in which the argumentative discourse takes place. In those cases, it is
necessary for determining whether or not a dialectical norm incorporated in the
rules for critical discussion has been violated to resort to specific soundness criteria
that depend on the institutionalized conventions of the specific communicative
activity type in which the argumentative moves concerned are made. Basically,
these specific soundness criteria indicate how the general soundness criteria need to
21 In argumentative practice it may happen that one of the parties does not agree with appealing to an
authority or with appealing to this particular authority because, for instance, this party is interested only in
learning what the other party himself has to say on the matter (‘‘Why do you refer to Professor Schama?
You said yourself that this is such a beautiful painting and now I would like to hear what your arguments
are for giving such a positive judgment’’).
22 Woods and Walton (1989, pp. 17–21) formulated, for instance, the following general ‘‘adequacy
conditions’’ for the argument from authority: (1) ‘‘The authority must be interpreted correctly’’; (2) ‘‘The
authority must actually have special competence in an area and not simply glamour, prestige, or
popularity’’; (3) ‘‘The judgment of authority must actually be within the special field of competence’’; (4)
‘‘Direct evidence must be available in principle’’; (5) ‘‘A consensus technique is required for adjudicating
disagreements among equally qualified authorities.’’
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be interpreted, amended or supplemented in the specific macro-context of this
communicative activity type.23
Let us return to the argument from authority to illustrate the case I am making.
Imagine that you and I are playing a game of scrabble and have decided to do this in
English. You know that I am a Dutchman who cannot be trusted with the English
language. On top of that, you also know that I am always eager to win such
inconsequential games. At a certain moment I claim to have compiled a word, but
you doubt that the combination of letters I have laid out really constitutes an English
word. Now I use an argument from authority to defend my claim: ‘‘This is an
English word, because it is in the dictionary.’’ Whether my appeal to authority is in
this case a sound strategic maneuver or a fallacy depends in the first place on the
existing agreement as to the testing procedure for deciding whether or not a
combination of letters that is claimed to be an English word does indeed count as an
English word.
If you and I had agreed—or if this was an existing agreement in this macro-
context—that a combination of letters would be regarded as an English word if both
of us recognized it as an English word, it would be hard for me to defend my claim
that the combination of letters I laid out constitutes an English word by means of a
reference to the dictionary. However, if we had agreed that in case of doubt we let
the dictionary decide, and I cite the dictionary correctly, then there is nothing wrong
with my argumentative move. The move ‘‘This is an English word, because it is in
this dictionary’’ would even be conclusive, unless you and I had also agreed in
advance that the Concise Oxford Dictionary would be the ultimate judge while in
my argument I am referring to Webster’s. If nothing had been agreed upon between
the two of us concerning how to decide a case like this, my appeal to the authority of
the dictionary could not be considered ‘‘fallacious,’’ because there would be no
decision criterion that could be applied—or ignored, for that matter. If there is no
decision criterion available that we explicitly or implicitly agree upon, it has to be
decided in the second instance whether I referred to an admissible source of
expertise when appealing to the dictionary, or whether this would only be so if I
referred (correctly) to the Concise Oxford Dictionary.24
In the scenarios just sketched, different specific criteria are used for complying
with the soundness norm incorporated in the argument-from-authority variant of the
Argument Scheme Rule. This illustrates how the specific soundness criteria for
judging arguments from authority may vary depending on the agreements reached
(or implicitly accepted) in the opening stage of the discussion taking place in a
certain communicative activity type. In a great many macro-contexts the conven-
tionalization of a particular communicative activity type preconditions such
agreements, and they affect not only the use of arguments from authority but also
23 Because the general soundness criteria need to be applied in widely diverging macro-contexts in which
different institutional needs must be satisfied, the exact meaning of the general criteria and the ways in
which their fulfillment can be checked may vary. Who or what counts as an authority, for instance, will be
different in a scientific debate than in a political interview.
24 A precondition for being allowed to consider this appeal to authority (and the other appeals to
authority I have mentioned) fallacious is, of course, that the criterion applied may be considered problem-
valid in the first place.
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the use of other modes of strategic maneuvering. This means that the specific
soundness criteria for judging the various modes of strategic maneuvering may
vary—at least to some extent—from communicative activity type to communicative
activity type. The examples I have just given concern explicit agreements made
between the parties, but such agreements between the parties could just as well
remain implicit. In actual practice, more often than not such agreements are not
really made between the parties but imposed upon them when they engage in a
particular communicative activity type, so that for certain modes of strategic
maneuvering the specific soundness criteria can be regarded as given. For some
communicative activity types, such as a chat or an apology, they will have been
acquired in primary socialization when becoming familiar with these communica-
tive activity types; for other communicative activity types, such as an academic
review or a writ, they will be known only to those who chose to make themselves
familiar with them in secondary socialization.
In the various communicative activity types constituting the macro-contexts of
strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse, different implementations of the
general soundness criteria have developed to realize the institutional point of the
communicative activity type concerned in an optimal way. These different
implementations may result in different sets of specific soundness criteria for the
same mode of strategic maneuvering in different communicative activity types. The
specific soundness criteria pertaining to strategic maneuvering by appealing to an
authority, for instance, will be different in some respects in the macro-context of a
criminal trial in the legal domain, where arguments from authority may take the
special form of eyewitness testimony and require authenticity, compared to those in
the macro-context of a scientific dispute in the scholarly domain, where arguments
the use of from authority consists in quoting qualified experts and is governed by
mutually recognized conventions.25
5 Conclusion
My conclusion is that in analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse we need
to take account not only of the intrinsic dialectical and rhetorical aims of strategic
maneuvering but also of the extrinsic conventional constraints imposed on the
strategic maneuvering by the macro-context of the institutionalized communicative
activity type in which the argumentative discourse takes place, because the
conventionalization of the communicative activity type disciplines the strategic
maneuvering. By viewing contextualization in this way, my approach to context
differs crucially from Walton’s. To start with, my notion of institutionalized
communicative activity types is purely empirical, and sharply distinguished from
normative ideal models such as a critical discussion, whereas the theoretical status
25 According to de Groot (1984), ideally, the Scientific Forum will keep considering the decision and
may eventually come to a different decision in the future. See also de Groot (1969). Together with the
problem-validity requirement this continuity of the assessment process is to protect scientific and




of Walton’s notion of dialogue types is not clear, but the notion lays claim to both a
normative and a descriptive status, because dialogue types are at the same time
defined as ‘‘normative ideal models’’ and as ‘‘conventionalized activities.’’26 This
conflation of normative and descriptive perspectives obscures the status of the goals
Walton ascribes to the various dialogue types,27 and indicates that he ignores a
distinction pertinent to the study of rule-governed linguistic behavior.
In studying linguistic behavior, it must be clearly distinguished between, first,
behavioral regularities or patterns of language use, second, the norms underlying
these regularities as they have been internalized by ordinary language users, and,
third, the external norms for judging language use as they are stipulated on analytic
grounds by the theorists. Next to a first corresponding research tradition in
linguistics and the study of language use concentrating on describing regularities in
language use, there is a second corresponding research tradition in ‘‘emic’’
descriptive pragmatics and discourse analysis focussing on tracing internal
normativity shared by language users, and a third one in ‘‘etic’’ normative
pragmatics and critical discourse analysis focussing on developing external norms
for judging the quality of language use. In the study of argumentation, the last kind
of focus is chosen by all dialecticians, whether formal, pragma-dialectical or
other—just as logicians and lawyers have done in other fields. These dialecticians
have a similar general aim: to develop ideal models that point out what optimally
reasonable argumentative behavior amounts to, so that argumentative behavior that
falls short of this ideal can be characterized as the commitment of some kind of
fallacy. To which of the three traditions Walton’s research on dialogue types
belongs is a question that is hard to answer.
26 One of the reasons why it does not become clear that Walton and Krabbe’s types of dialogue are—
contrary to their normative claims—empirical categories is that the norms pertaining to the various
dialogue types are not unequivocally related to the goals of the activity types concerned. On the one hand,
normative concerns are given priority, which is made explicit when Walton and Krabbe emphasize that
‘‘structures or systems of dialogue are normative models that represent ideals of how one ought to
participate in a certain type of conversation if one is being reasonable and cooperative’’ and warn that
they should not be confused with ‘‘an account of how participants in argumentation really behave in
instances of real dialogue that take place […] in a speech event’’ (1995, p. 67). On the other hand,
however, their concept of dialogue types has unmistakably a strong empirical flavor, as is evident in
Walton’s characterization of the various types of dialogue. When, for instance, he makes his case for the
context-dependent fallaciousness of ad baculum arguments, he supports his position by observing that
‘‘during a negotiation type of dialogue, threats and appeals to force or sanctions are quite typical and
characteristic’’ (1992, p. 141). In this case, and in many more cases adduced by Walton, the observation
of an empirical regularity—describable in quantitative terms such as ‘‘often,’’ or quantifiable terms such
as ‘‘typically’’ and ‘‘characteristically’’—creates in his approach the normative basis for giving a fallacy
judgment.
27 Are they formulated based on empirical analyses or are they stipulated based on theoretical
considerations? In other words, are these goals familiar, or at least reflectively recognizable, to the
discussants or are they formulated by some theorist, in this case Walton and Krabbe themselves? The
enormous diversity of the goals Walton and Krabbe assign to the various dialogue types raises the
additional question of which of these dialogue types are really argumentative: what definition of ‘‘being
argumentative’’ is applied in determining this quality? Whichever interpretation Walton and Krabbe may
have intended to enforce, it seems to me that the point has to be made that there must be a theoretical
rationale for considering discourses or verbal moves to be argumentative that is independent of the
specific empirical environment—or type of dialogue—in which they occur.
158 F. H. van Eemeren
123
Granting that intersubjective agreement concerning the acceptability of argu-
mentative moves is indeed a prerequisite for reaching in argumentative reality a
resolution of a difference of opinion, in order to reach a resolution of the difference
of opinion on the merits, as pragma-dialecticians have in mind, the ‘‘problem-
solving validity’’ of the norms applied in judging the acceptability of these moves
comes first—that is, before their ‘‘conventional validity.’’ On the meta-level too,
before external norms such as those incorporated in the rules for critical discussion
can be tested for their conventional validity, their problem-solving validity is to be
established first.28 A prerequisite for being able to do so is that the ‘‘emic’’ and the
‘‘etic’’ study of the norms for sound argumentative discourse are clearly kept
separated. Apparent acceptability and institutional appropriateness cannot be
automatically equated with external reasonableness which has passed the prob-
lem-validity test. Nevertheless, this is what Walton seems to do—with a certain kind
of ‘‘postmodern’’ relativism as a result. I think that, instead of being decided on
dubious grounds in advance, the issue of the extent to which the criteria for judging
the quality of argumentative discourse may be context-dependent should be dealt
with on the basis of a careful analysis of the various communicative activity types in
which argumentation plays a part. Rather than a postmodern relativization of
reasonableness, I go for a contextual specification of general criteria for judging
whether ‘‘universal’’ dialectical norms of reasonableness have been fulfilled.
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